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• Divert newly available resources (such as unused travel allowances) and leverage funding from the 
private sector and/or international partners, sovereign wealth funds, national reserves and other 
sinking funds to increase allocations to pro-poor sectors. In the long term, the tax capacity of Nigeria 
and Uganda should be improved. 
About CoMPRA
The COVID-19 Macroeconomic Policy Response in Africa (CoMPRA) project was 
developed following a call for rapid response policy research into the COVID-19 
pandemic by the IDRC. The project’s overall goal is to inform macroeconomic 
policy development in response to the COVID-19 pandemic by low and middle-
income countries (LMICs) and development partners that results in more 
inclusive, climate-resilient, effective and gender-responsive measures through 
evidence-based research. This will help to mitigate COVID-19’s social and 
economic impact, promote recovery from the pandemic in the short term 
and position LMICs in the longer term for a more climate-resilient, sustainable 
and stable future. The CoMPRA project will focus broadly on African countries 
and specifically on six countries (Benin, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria 
and South Africa). SAIIA and CSEA, as the lead implementing partners for this 
project, also work with think tank partners in these countries. 
• Use electronic platforms to distribute cash to hard-to-reach populations such as informal 
sector workers and low-income households. National databases such as voters’ rolls, social 
registers and household surveys can be used to identify vulnerable people. 
• Promote investment in renewable energy, particularly for low-income households. Areas that 
are too remote to be connected to the electricity grid would also benefit from decentralised 
energy sources.
Our Donor 
This project is supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).  
The IDRC is a Canadian federal Crown corporation. It is part of Canada’s foreign 
affairs and development efforts and invests in knowledge, innovation, and solutions 
to improve the lives of people in the developing world.
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Executive summary
Countries across the world have deployed macroeconomic policies to address the negative 
economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown measures. However, 
these policies can have different outcomes for various segments of the population. This policy 
briefing assesses the channels through which macroeconomic policy responses in Nigeria and 
Uganda negatively affect or exclude specific groups, with the aim of resetting policies to achieve 
more inclusive outcomes that will support economic growth and development in the post-
COVID future. It finds that the urban poor and the informal sector are being excluded as a result 
of the poor coverage of cash transfer programmes and the implementation of policies mostly 
applicable to the formal sector. Loans to low-income borrowers are not likely to increase despite 
downward revisions to the monetary policy rate, while importers and poorer households will 
be the worst hit by exchange rate adjustments in Nigeria. While the middle class and rich are 
affected by the removal of subsidies in Nigeria, those living in poverty do not benefit from the 
budget restructuring in Uganda.
Introduction
While economic recessions can have significant distributional effects, the macroeconomic 
policies adopted to counteract recessions can have varying outcomes on different segments of 
the population. As such, a government’s policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic can increase 
inequalities through key transmission channels. Data from the International Monetary Fund’s 
Policy Response Tracker shows that 89% of African countries have deployed fiscal stimuli for 
vulnerable populations, including those who have lost their livelihoods as a result of the crisis and 
low-income households. Liquidity has been provided to affected businesses and sectors such as 
tourism, hospitality and aviation in 92% of African countries.1 Yet the design and implementation 
of such macroeconomic policies are often neutral, thus allowing existing forms of inequality 
to worsen. This policy briefing assesses the ways in which macroeconomic policy responses in 
Nigeria and Uganda negatively affect or exclude specific groups, particularly youth, women, 
the informal sector and the newly poor (especially in urban areas). In addition, businesses in the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
are negatively impacted by these policy responses. The aim of this policy briefing is to help reset 
policies to achieve more inclusive outcomes that will support economic growth and development 
in the post-COVID future.
1 International Monetary Fund, “Policy Responses to COVID-19”, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19.
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The analysis covers the fiscal and monetary policies deployed by the Nigerian and Ugandan 
governments and shows how these policies could lead to worse outcomes for certain segments of 
the population. The dimensions of disparities considered for individuals include age, gender, place 
of residence (rural or urban) and income category; for businesses the dimensions include size of 
business and sector (agriculture, manufacturing and services).
Key findings
Poor coverage and cash transfer targeting exclude the urban poor. Both Nigeria and Uganda 
have expanded existing cash transfer programmes to deliver funds to the poor and those most 
vulnerable to the pandemic. Nigeria has scaled up its programme by increasing its National 
Social Register of poor and vulnerable households by 1.1 million households to 3.7 million 
households (15.5 million individuals).2 The government gives NGN 3 5,000 ($13) per month to the 
poorest households for at least three years to ensure food security. Similarly, since the pandemic 
the Ugandan government has increased funding for the Urban Cash for Work Programme 
(UCWP) to UGX4 130 billion ($35 million) and social welfare programmes by UGX 152 billion  
($41 million), with an additional UGX 45 billion ($12.03 million) for government relief aid in 
response to COVID-19 and another UGX 107 billion ($28.6 million) for the Social Assistance 
Grants for Empowerment (SAGE), targeting the elderly.5 Under SAGE, each beneficiary is paid 
UGX 25,000 ($6.7) per month. The programmes have also been expanded, with the UCWP 
covering an additional 500 000 individuals and SAGE an additional 71 districts.6 
Despite these expansions, these cash transfer programmes underperform significantly in terms 
of size, coverage and targeting. At 0.002% and 0.00017% respectively, spending on cash transfer 
programmes as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in Uganda and Nigeria is meagre.7  
As a result, the programmes’ coverage falls significantly short. Based on the 2019 Nigerian Living 
Standards Survey (NLSS), about 83 million Nigerians are living in poverty, implying that 81% 
of poor people are excluded from the National Social Register.8 Similarly, in Uganda 10 million 
2 Nan, “FG Enrolls 15.5m Persons in National Social Register”, The Guardian (Nigeria), August 23, 2020, https://guardian.ng/news/fg-enrolls-15-5m-
persons-in-national-social-register/.
3 Currency code for the Nigerian naira.
4 Currency code for the Ugandan shilling.
5 Development Initiatives, Socioeconomic Impact of COVID-19 in Uganda: How Has the Government Allocated Public Expenditure for FY2020/21?  
(Nairobi: Development Initiatives, August 2020), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Socioeconomic_impact_of_Covid-19_in_
Uganda.pdf.
6 World Bank, “Uganda: World Bank Provides $300 Million to Close COVID-19 Financing Gap and Support Economy Recover” (Press Release 2020/158/
AFR, World Bank, Nairobi, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/06/29/uganda-world-bank-provides-300-million-to-
close-covid-19-financing-gap-and-support-economy-recover.
7 IMF, “Policy Responses to COVID-19”.
8 National Bureau of Statistics, “2019 Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria: Executive Summary” (Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).
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people are living in poverty, based on the household survey in 
2016/17.9 However, only 1.5 million people benefited from the 
UCWP.10 Furthermore, the amounts allocated do not cover 
the cost of a basic nutritious diet per month for a household 
of five. 
Given the strategy of identifying poor households in Nigeria 
– using the National Social Register to select the poorest 
30% of households in states with high poverty levels – the 
beneficiaries are mostly members of agrarian and rural 
communities. Yet the newly poor in urban areas, such as SME 
owners, drivers and cleaners, are most susceptible to income 
shocks caused by the pandemic, making the targeting of the 
cash transfer programme sub-optimal. Even in Uganda, the 
majority of the additional funds is targeted at the UCWP and 
SAGE. However, the former is likely to experience delays owing 
to the pandemic and the elderly are not particularly prone to 
income shocks from the pandemic. In addition, the eligibility 
age for the SAGE programme was increased from 65 to 80 
years, thus reducing the size of the target population.
Most of the policies deployed – tax relief, interest rate 
reductions, debt moratoriums and loan restructuring – do not 
impact the informal sector, affecting women and agricultural 
workers disproportionately. While both countries are using 
a range of policies to mitigate the impact of the pandemic 
on individuals and businesses, these policies mostly benefit 
formal sector workers and businesses. Yet the informal sector 
accounts for 65% and 50% of Nigeria and Uganda’s GDP 
respectively, and employs 80% of the labour force in both 
countries.11 Although not all informal workers are poor, they 
9 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, “2019 Statistical Abstract”, https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/
uploads/publications/01_20202019_Statistical_Abstract_ -Final.pdf.
10 Development Initiatives, Socioeconomic Impact of COVID-19. 
11 Bank of Industry, “Economic Development Through the Nigerian Informal Sector: A BOI 
Perspective” (Working Paper No. 2, Bank of Industry, Lagos, May 17, 2018), https://www.boi.
ng/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/BOI-Working-Paper-Series-No2_Economic-Development-
through-the-Nigerian-Informal-Sector-A-BOI-perspective.pdf; Andrew Rugasira, “Unpacking 
Uganda’s Informal Sector”, Independent News, May 22, 2016, https://www.inde pendent.co.ug 
/unpacking-ugandas-informal-sector/; International Labour Organization, Women and Men in 
the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture (Geneva: ILO Publications, 2018), https://www.ilo.
org/global/publications/books/WCMS_626831/lang--en/index.htm.
“Most of the policies 
deployed – tax relief, 
interest rate reductions, 
debt moratoriums and 
loan restructuring – do 
not impact the informal 
sector, affecting women 
and agricultural workers 
disproportionately“
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face a higher risk of poverty, are more susceptible to income 
shocks than their counterparts in the formal sector, and live 
in urban areas with higher living costs and little recourse to 
subsistence agriculture. With women accounting for 74% 
of workers (non-agriculture)12 in the informal sector in sub-
Saharan Africa, and the agricultural sector contributing 
significantly to the informal economy, women and those who 
work in agriculture do not benefit from these relief policies. 
Downward revisions to central banks’ policy rates have 
failed to reflect in the lending rate of commercial banks, 
particularly affecting high-risk and low-income borrowers 
such as small-scale farmers, SME owners, youth and women. 
Expansionary monetary policies have been adopted, with 
the Central Bank of Nigeria reducing its monetary policy 
rate from 13.5% to 11.5% and the Bank of Uganda reducing 
its rate from 9% to 7%.13 However, interest on loans made 
by commercial banks remains high, affecting high-risk and 
low-income borrowers. Owing to externally determined 
conditions such as weather and price volatility, workers in 
the agricultural sector are widely viewed as high risk, making 
it difficult to reduce the lending rate offered to them. In 
addition, segments of the population with low income and 
limited access to collateral such as SME owners, youth and 
women are less likely to be offered favourable loan terms.
Exchange rate adjustments in Nigeria are having a direct 
negative impact on importers and an indirect impact on 
poorer households through rising domestic inflation. With 
crude oil contributing about 80% of foreign exchange 
12 “Five Facts About Informal Economy in Africa”, ILO News, June 18, 2015, https://www.ilo.org/
africa/whats-new/WCMS_377286/lang--en/index.html.
13 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Central Bank of Nigeria Communiqué no. 132 of the Monetary 
Policy Committee meeting held on 21st and 22nd September 2020”, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/
Out/2020/MPD/Central%20Bank%20of%20Nigeria%20Communique%20No.%20132%20
of%20the%20Monetary% 20Policy%20Committee%20Meeting%20Held%20September%20
21%20and%2022%202020.pdf; Bank of Uganda, “Monetary Policy Statement for October 
2020”, https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/bouwebsitecontent/MediaCenter/press_
releases/2020/Oct/Monetary-Policy-Statement_October-2020-.pdf.
“Downward revisions to 
central banks’ policy rates 
have failed to reflect in the 
lending rate of commercial 
banks, particularly affecting 
high-risk and low-income 
borrowers such as small-
scale farmers, SME owners, 
youth and women“
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earnings,14 the foreign exchange shortage owing to the decline in demand for oil has put pressure 
on the exchange rate, leading to the devaluation of the naira. The official exchange rate was first 
adjusted from NGN 307/$1 to NGN 361/$1, and then to NGN 380/$1.15 These revisions have led 
to a rise in the price of imports, particularly affecting the manufacturing sector, which is heavily 
dependent on imported raw materials and intermediate goods. As a result, domestic prices are 
rising, with implications for the purchasing power of poor citizens. 
Removal of electricity and fuel subsidies is having a disproportionate impact on the income of 
the middle class and rich. As a result of the pandemic, the Nigerian government has increased 
the fuel price from NGN 121 ($0.32) to NGN 162 ($0.43) per litre. The electricity tariff has gone 
from NGN 30.23 ($0.08) to NGN 62.33 ($0.16) per kwh (for consumers with an electricity supply 
above 12 hours per day). The drop in government revenues necessitated the removal of these 
electricity and fuel subsidies. Given that poor households were not the main beneficiaries of these 
subsidy programmes – 43% of Nigerians, mostly those living in rural areas, do not have access 
to electricity16 and low-income households use relatively less fuel and electricity – the subsidy 
removal is likely to reduce the disposable income of the middle class and rich.  
Budget restructuring in Uganda does not support those living in poverty. Neither the 
supplementary budget passed before the end of the 2019/20 fiscal year nor the 2020/21 budget 
caters adequately for those people most affected by the pandemic. The main beneficiaries of 
the supplementary budget are SMEs able to access funds from the Uganda Development Bank 
(UGX 455 billion [$122.1 million]) and suppliers of goods to government through the clearing of 
domestic arrears (UGX 223 billion [$59.9 million]), with allocations to social protection coming 
in third at UGX 105 billion ($28.2 million).17 Similarly, the sectors with the biggest increases 
in budget allocation in 2020/21 are water and environment (35%), science, technology and 
innovation (30%), local government (28%) and public administration (26%).18 Even in Nigeria, 
the 2020 budgetary allocations to works, power and housing; agriculture; and information 
and communications increased relative to the 2019 budget, while there were reductions in the 
allocations to education (16%), health (11%) and humanitarian affairs (12%).19
14 World Bank, “Nigeria Bi-Annual Economic Update: Fragile Recovery” (Washington DC: World Bank, 2017), http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/349511494584937819/pdf/114996-WP-P163291-PUBLIC-NEUNoFinalfromPublisher.pdf.
15 Central Bank of Nigeria, “CBN Exchange Rates”, https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/ExchRateByCurrency.asp.
16 World Bank, “Access to Electricity (% of Population): Nigeria”, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=NG.
17 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group, Citizens' Guide to 
the Budget FY 2020/21 (Kampala: CSBAG, 2020), https://budget.go.ug/sites/default/files/National%20Budget%20docs/The%20Citizen%27s%20
Guide%20To%20The%20Budget%20FY%202020-21.pdf.
18 Government of Uganda, Citizens' Guide to the Budget.
19 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Budget Office of the Federation, 2020 Revised Appropriation Bill (Abuja: Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National 
Planning, 2020), https://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/2020-revised-appropriation-bill.
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Table 1 Macroeconomic policy responses in Nigeria and Uganda, versus 
excluded groups
Policy Country Excluded segments of the population
Cash transfer programme Nigeria and Uganda
A large share of the newly poor, particularly those 
living in urban areas
Tax relief, interest rate reductions, debt 
moratoriums and loan restructuring
Nigeria and 
Uganda
The informal sector, with women and agricultural 
sector workers affected disproportionately
Reduction in monetary policy rate Nigeria and Uganda
High-risk and low-income borrowers such as those in 
agriculture, SMEs, youth and women
Exchange rate adjustments Nigeria Importers, particularly the manufacturing sector, and the poor
Removal of electricity and  
fuel subsidies Nigeria Middle class and rich
Budget restructuring Nigeria and Uganda The poor
Source: Compiled by author
Conclusion
Existing forms of inequality can deepen in the face of a major crisis such as the COVID-19 
pandemic – and as a result of the neutrality of policies deployed in response to the crisis. The 
macroeconomic policy responses of the Nigerian and Ugandan governments have had the 
unintended effect of excluding youth, women, the informal sector and the newly poor (particularly 
in urban areas). At the same time, the removal of electricity and fuel subsidies are affecting the 
middle class and rich disproportionately, given that these groups were the beneficiaries of the 
initial subsidy programme. In addition, businesses in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, 
alongside SMEs, are likely to be negatively affected by some of the policy responses.  
Excluding a wide range of the population will not only affect present living conditions and 
wellbeing but also limit the private sector spending required to stabilise the economy and avert 
or recover from a recession. While the governments of both countries have increased spending in 
order to counteract the drop in private sector consumption and investment, taking on debt for 
this purpose, debt sustainability remains a pressing issue. As evidenced by their current budgets, 
debt servicing takes up a considerable amount of government revenue with implications for 
development spending.
In future, response strategies should be context-specific and take into consideration existing 
inequalities in order to provide a more tailored and inclusive approach. This will ensure that all 
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segments of the population are reached, lead to efficiency in spending and limit negative welfare 
impacts. 
Governments should revise their budget allocations to healthcare and social protection in order 
to address the needs of vulnerable people and affected businesses. In the short term, this can 
be done by using newly available resources (such as unused travel allowances), funding from the 
private sector and/or international partners, sovereign wealth funds, national reserves and other 
sinking funds. In the long term, the tax capacity of both countries needs to be improved to allow 
government to mobilise adequate domestic resources to meet current needs and build fiscal 
buffers. 
Given the widespread access to mobile phones and the ease of electronic transfers, both 
countries should adopt electronic platforms to distribute cash to hard-to-reach populations. 
Countries that used electronic transfers extensively before the pandemic, such as Kenya, have 
been able to use these platforms for cash payments during the pandemic. National databases 
can be used to effectively identify vulnerable people. 
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency, half of new solar and wind installations 
are cheaper than fossil fuel energy sources,20 making renewable energy more affordable on 
average. Thus, promoting investment in and use of renewable energy is crucial, particularly for 
low-income households. 
20 Harry Kretchmer, “Chart of The Day: Renewables Are Increasingly Cheaper than Coal”, World Economic Forum, June 23, 2020, https://www.weforum.
org/agenda/2020/06/renewable-energy-cheaper-coal/.
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